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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
recovery of real estate and untenable for personal injuries? "Are
property rights, strictly speaking, of more importance to the infant
than the rights of person?"
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION-In 1919, the
appellant Bockler contracted to buy from Wurfel certain realty on
which was located a store building together with the merchandise
contained therein. Part of the purchase price was to be paid in cash,
the balance by delivery of a deed of a lot in Portland. Appellant
moved upon the premises where he remained for five years. Wurfel,
after considerable trouble perfected his title and tendered a deed which
was not accepted. He sued for specific performance. The court
denied a decree, finding that his title was defective as to part of the
realty and -that the lot to be deeded by Bockler was owned by his
wife who had not joined in the contract. Mrs. Bockler then began
an action to have removed an alleged cloud upon her title. Her hus-
band was joined as a party defendant. Held, that Mrs. Bockler was
the absolute owner of the Portland lot, that Wurfel should recover
from the appellant Bockler $3500, the agreed value of the lot, and
made this sum a lien upon the property purchased. Pending appeal,
Wurfel issued execution and at the public sale became the purchaser
of the property. Bockler v. Wurfel, et al., 254 Pac. 353 (Sup. Ct.
Oregon, 1927).
Appellant's principal objection was that the result was wholly
inequitable, his vendor now having both the property and a substan-
tial part of the purchase price. This seemingly carried force, but the
court pointed out that the vendee had had the use of the store for
five years and quoted from his testimony to show the value of the
business to him. The appellant's further objection that the passage of
time precluded a decree of specific performance of the original agree-
ment was disapproved. Time was not of the essence, the vendor
had perfected his title without having been guilty of laches, and the
court could at this time properly decree specific performance of the
original agreement to the extent possible. Katz v. Hathaway, 66
Wash. 355, 119 Pac. 804 (1911).
The trial court in proceeding to dispose finally of the entire con-
troversy was held to have properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction.
This accords with general principles of Equity and with the doctrine
of similar cases. Wood v. Hill 214 App. Div. 417, 212 N. Y. Supp.
550 (1925).; Madsen v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781
(1925). As was well said in Brown v. Winne, 92 Okla. 289, 219 Pac.
114 (1923), "A Court of Equity which once obtains jurisdiction of a
controversy administers complete relief."
EQUITY-ORAL AGREEMENT TO Buy PROPERTY AND HOLD FOR MORT-
GAGOR-STATUTE or FRAUDS.-The. plaintiff executed a deed of trust on
a plantation to defendants as security for loans. By written agree-
ment defendant Tchula was to operate the property for plaintiff's
benefit until 1925, but in February, 1924, plaintiff was informed that
the property would be sold in March, 1924, due to the pressure of the
state bank examiner. It was thereupon verbally agreed that the de-
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fendant Tchula should buy in the property and continue to operate it
for plaintiff's benefit with the right.to him to redeem before February
1, 1925. This agreement was stipulated to be reduced to writing and
the sale was to be delayed until such time as the agreement to permit
redemption was executed. The sale took place without the agree-
ment being executed or reduced to writing and defendants refused to
permit the redemption thereafter although plaintiff was ready and
willing to meet the loans. The property had been bought in by de-
fendant bank which in turn conveyed it to its present president who
was also president of the Tchula Commercial Co. Plaintiff sued
claiming conspiracy and fraud b3i defendants to deprive him of his
property. The statute of frauds was set up in bar. Hcld, that equity
could grant relief, the action not being for specific performance but
for damages due to defendants' fraud in breaching the contract.
Further, that an agreement of the nature involved, orally made, was
enforcible in equity, despite the statute of frauds. Judgment -for the
complainant affirmed in part and reversed in part. Tchula Commercial
Co., et al. v. Jackson, 111 So. 874 (Miss. 1927).
There is some authority for the latter proposition. Vannoy v.
Martin, 41 N. C. 169 (1848), 51 Am. Dec. 418; Griffin v. Coffey, 9
B. Mon. (Ky.) 452 (1849), 50 Am., Dec. 519; Note: 102 A. S. R.
244; Soggins v. Heard, 31 Miss. 426 (1856). This is upon the theory
that to permit the defense to be interposed that the agreement was
not in writing would be to allow the' statute to cover a fraud.
Schroeder v. Young, 161 U. S. 334 (1895), 40 U. S. (L. ed.) 721;
Turpie v. Lowe, 158 Ind. 314, 62 N. E. 484 (1902)-; Griffin v. Coffey,
supra; Laing v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124 (1865), 87 Am. Dec. 738 (tax
sale). Thus where a mortgage is foreclosed under an oral agreement
to reconvey to the mortgagor after the period of redemption has ex-
pired, upon payment or tender of the amotint due, the mortgagor is
bound by the agreement in equity. Ogden v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 556, 89
N. E. 741 (1909); Turpie v. Lowe, supra; Dow v. Bradley, 110 Me.
249, 85 Atl. 896 (1913); Oertel.v. Pierce, 116 Minn. 266, 133 N. W.
797 (1911); Turner v. Johnson, 95 Mo. 431, S. W. 570 (1888); Arnold
v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177 (1861). As to the former proposition that an
action for damages for breach of the oral contract may be maintained
see Johnson v. Hoover, 73 Ind. 395 (1880), in accord. It has also
been held that if the party sought to be charged has, by fraudulent
purposes, prevented the contract from being reduced to writing, a
court of equity will grant relief notwithstanding the statdte of frauds.
Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106, 19 Pac. 227 (1888); McAnnully v. Mc-
Annully, 120 Ill. 20, 11 N. E. 397 (1887); Glass v. Hulbert, 102
Mass. 24 (1869), 3 Am. Rep. 418. Thus if property has been ob-
tained by reason of a promise to hold it for another, and the latter,
confiding in the purchaser, is prevented from taking such action on
his own behalf as would have secured the benefit of the property to
himself, it would be against equity and good conscience for the latter
to refuse to perform his solemn agreement. 26 R. C. L. 1244; 5 Ann.
Cas. 173. In this case the purchaser is treated as a trustee for the
debtor uhder a constructive trust. Soggins v. Heard, 31 Miss. 426
(1856); Story's Eq. (14th. ed. 1918) secs. 452-4; 27 C. j. 340-342.
Such trusts are not within the statute because they rest in the end on
the doctrine of estoppel and the operation of an estoppel is never
effected by the statute of frauds. Parker v. Catron, 120 Ky. 145, 85
211
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S. W. 740 (1905). Thus where the debtor has been lulled into a
feeling of false security by the statements of the defendant, the lat-
ter is estopped from setting up the statute of frauds because the
instrument was not in writing. Combs v. Little, 4 N. J. Eq. 310
(1843), 40 Am. Dec. 207. In view of the strict scrutiny of this class
of case by the New York courts, it is doubtful whether the instant
holding would he supported in New York. But it is clearly estab-
lished in this jurisdiction that where the parties stand in close con-
fidential relations, an abuse of confidence produced by fraud will
move a court of equity to grant relief. Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414
(1884); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 318, 39 N. E. 1067
(1895) ; Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. Y. 222, 228, 73 N. E. 984 (1905).
CRIMINAL LAw-LARcENY.-The defendant was the tenant of an
apartment under a lease, the term of which had expired, but the right
of occupation and possession continued under statute. He inserted an
ad in a newspaper offering to sub-rent by month or year. The com-
plaining witness answered the ad and paid the defendant a sum which
represented the agreed rental, but did not receive possession either on the
day when the contract was made or any other time. The defendant
continued to run the ad. The indictment contained two counts. The
first charged obtaining money tinder false pretenses and the second
with larceny by trick and device. The first count was dismissed and the
defendant was found guilty on the second. Held, that the evidence
was insufficient to support the indictment charging larceny by trick
and device. Judgment reversed and indictment dismissed, two judges
dissenting. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355 (1927).
For a discussion of the principles involved see supra, page 176.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-The action was brought to test the con-
stitutionality of sec. 167-174 of the General Business Law of New
York which forbade the resale of theatre tickets at an advance of
more than 50 cents above the printed price. The case was heard by
a special Constitutional Court below and the decree dismissing the bill
was brought to the Supreme Court for review. Held, the act is uncon-
stitutional in that it deprived the plaintiff of property without due
process of law. Decree reversed and injunction granted. Tyson z'.
Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (U. S. 1927).
In this case the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional a statute
of the State of New York fixing the resale price of theatre tickets
by so called brokers to fifty cents above the price printed on the ticket.
Other features of this. statute had already been upheld by the court.
See Weller v. New York, 268 U. S. 319 (1926). It follows that the
only difficulty with the statute was that it attempted to fix prices.
This the majority said can not be done in an industry not affected with
a public interest. The majority reaffirm Lord Hale's proposition con-
cerning industries affected with a public use but leaves wide open the
discovery of a method of ascertaining which industries can beincluded
under that head. It must appear therefore that the ultimate solution
to the problem is to be found by the judicial method of inclusion and
exclusion. The dissenting judges divide into three classes. Mr. Justice
Stone points out that the statute does not necessarily fix prices but can
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